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1 Introduction
Here is what happens in this paper. I make a certain distinction. I use the dis-
tinction to frame two directions that an expressivist view of normative language
might take. I then plump for one these directions.
Here is what happens in this paper in a bit more detail. I make a distinc-
tion: there is on the one hand the traditional speech act-theoretic notion of
illocutionary force, and there on the other hand the kind of notion of force we
have in mind when we are theorizing in formal pragmatics about conversational
states and their characteristic modes of update. I say these notions are di↵erent,
and occur at di↵erent levels of abstraction. They are not helpfully viewed as
in competition. I then say that the expressivist idea that normative language
is distinctive in force can be developed in two sorts of directions, depending
on which of the two senses of ‘force’ just distinguished is emphasized. One fa-
miliar tradition tries to develop expressivism as the thesis that the meaning of
normative language is somehow to be explained via its putative connections to
non-assertoric illocutionary forces. But that path is prone to Frege-Geach-style
worries. Expressivists do better to take the other path, and start with the idea
that normative discourse is distinctive in respect of its dynamic e↵ect on the
state of the conversation (Yalcin [2012a,b]; cf. Lewis [1979a,b], Veltman [1996],
Ninan [2005], Stalnaker [2014], Pe´rez-Carballo and Santorio [2016], Starr [2016],
Willer [forthcoming]). This approach is not in principle subject to special wor-
ries about compositionality. It can be developed further using static semantic
or dynamic semantic tools. It coheres with familiar lines of thinking about the
metaphysics of content. It goes far, I suggest, in accommodating the core ideas
expressivists have traditionally wanted to capture.
I then go on a bit more about how to think about expressivism in this
style, building on Gibbard [2003]’s notion of a plan-laden state of mind, and his
technical notion of a ‘hyperplan’. I find much that is attractive in Gibbard’s
⇤Draft of a paper forthcoming for Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris, and Matt Moss (eds.) New
Work on Speech Acts. I am greatly indebted to Daniel Harris for illuminating comments on
an earlier draft. Thanks also to Edward Schwartz.
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overall approach, but—getting into expressivist inside baseball—I suggest two
modifications. First I suggest that we not take hyperplans as primitive elements;
instead I suggest it is clarifying to view them as constructed from possibilia.
Second I o↵er a way for the expressivist to approach answering the question:
“In virtue of what does a state of mind have the plan-laden content it has?” The
sort of answer I recommend is broadly ‘functionalist’ and ‘representationalist’ in
character. I suggest that the expressivist can approach this question in the same
general way that, e.g., Lewis [1979c, 1994] approaches the analogous question
as it arises for his modeling proposal about content (namely the question: “In
virtue of what does a state of mind have the centered worlds content it has?”). I
deny that an expressivist in this vein has any special problem about explaining
what it is for two normative states of mind to be inconsistent. Ultimately
the sort of expressivism I envisage is unusual in that it does not call for a
radical rethinking of semantics, its foundations, or the theory of content; on the
contrary, it presupposes and conservatively extends a broadly non-deflationary
and representationalist conception of the mental, and can be made to mesh with
compositional semantic theories of familiar varieties.
2 Separating illocutionary force and dynamic force
There are many things one could mean (and have been meant) by ‘force’ in
theorizing about linguistic communication. As advertised, I want to start by
separating two broad ideas. The first idea I will call illocutionary force. The
second idea I will call dynamic force.
Begin with illocutionary force. The terminology owes of course to Austin,
but as I want to frame it, this general way of approaching force corresponds to
a big tent, and goes back at least to Frege on assertion. There are two key ways
that Frege gives us a handle on the notion of assertoric force. First, force is con-
trasted with an intuitive notion of content. Frege would say that the assertion
that p and the query whether p is the case both “contain the same thought” or
have the same content, namely, that p. Force is the name for the remainder,
for the dimension that varies across these speech acts. This way of introducing
the notion of force remains common in contemporary work.1 Second, drawing
on aspects of Kant’s theory of judgment, Frege described assertion as the out-
ward manifestation of the inner act of judgment, where an act of judgement
1An example from the first page of Searle and Vanderveken [1985]: “In general an illocu-
tionary act consists of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content P. For example, the
two utterances “You will leave the room” and “Leave the room!” have the same propositional
content, namely that you will leave the room; but characteristically the first of these has the
illocutionary force of a prediction and the second has the illocutionary force of an order.” See
also Green [2015].
2
is something like an event of coming to believe, an event of taking-to-be-true.
On such a view, assertoric force has a constitutive tie to the mental state of
believing or judging, and (thereby) to the normative requirements governing
these states of mind. You shouldn’t believe (judge) that p unless you have the
appropriate epistemic relation to p (whatever that epistemic relation may be
exactly—su cient evidence, justification, knowledge, etc.). Since on this view
assertion just is a way of manifesting a mental state of belief or judgment, it is
naturally taken to be subject to normative requirements of a similar character.2
Austin [1961, 1962] followed Frege in conceiving of the force of a speech
act as the sort of thing that (inter alia) situates the content expressed with
respect to extra-conversational aspects of the speaker’s state of mind, but his
work placed a special emphasis on the broader rational objectives that animate
speakers. The answer to the question what the illocutionary force of a speech
act is is approached by asking what the agent is trying to do in speaking. Speech
acts are individuated in part by appeal to the kinds of state of mind they are
normally associated with, but also in part by appeal to the typical sorts of
rational objectives associated with performing them. The illocutionary force of
a speech act locates it at a level of description incorporating a broad sphere of
human activity and social interaction. Searle [1969] is an extended development
of Austin’s approach. Some in this tradition, drawing on Grice [1957], place
a special emphasis on a particular subclass of objectives, namely those having
to do with getting the addressee to recognize the speaker’s intentions (see, e.g.,
Strawson [1964], Bach and Harnish [1979]). Within this broad approach to force,
there is of course considerable room for debate about how exactly to divide the
space of forces, and about how to analyze the force of any given speech act.
Since there is a seemingly boundless array of things speakers might do by
using language, this way of thinking about force tends to lead to a rich diversity
of forces. Searle and Vanderveken [1985], for instance, suggest that the fol-
lowing kinds of speech acts all correspond to characteristically di↵erent forces:
assertions, predictions, reminders, objections, conjectures, complaints, orders,
requests, declarations, promises, vows, pledges, apologies, admissions, boasts,
laments, and bets. (That is a selection; their o cial list is longer.) To perform
any of these acts is in part to manifest that one’s beliefs, desires, intentions,
2A related approach is that of Williamson [1996, 2000], who argues that assertion is dis-
tinguished by a certain constitutive norm, one which makes reference to the knowledge state
of the speaker. (Assertion could be said to ‘manifest’ a state of knowledge on this approach
partly in virtue of the fact that the speech act itself is partly constituted by the rule one
asserts p only if one knows p.) Williamson’s general approach suggests that speech acts forces
are individuated by their “constitutive rules”—rules which (like the knowledge rule for as-
sertion) are typically articulated via appeal to the folk-psychological mental states of the
interlocutors—their knowledge, beliefs, preferences, etc.
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and/or actions outside of the context of the discourse are subject to certain
norms. (Perhaps, as with performatives, in virtue of the very performance of
the speech act.)
A second, very di↵erent thing one could have in mind by the ‘force’ of an
utterance is (something like) the characteristic kind of change to the state of
the conversation the utterance is apt to produce. This sort of idea—what I
want to call dynamic force—began to come into focus in the seventies, when
theorists like Karttunen, Stalnaker, Lewis, Kamp, and Heim began to ‘formal-
ize pragmatics’ and explore various ways of making the whole conversation or
discourse itself the object of systematic formal investigation (Karttunen [1969,
1974]; Stalnaker [1974, 1978]; Lewis [1979b]; Kamp [1981]; Heim [1982]; see also
Hamblin [1971], Gazdar [1979]).3 The account of assertion in Stalnaker [1978]
provides a paradigm case of this way of thinking about force. On this view,
the characteristic conversational e↵ect of successful assertion is to change the
conversational state by adding information to it. Stalnaker models the state
of a conversation by a set of possible worlds, the possible worlds left open by
what is jointly presupposed by the interlocutors in the discourse—what he calls
a context set. To gain information is, in the possible worlds setting, for there
to be fewer possibilities compatible with your information, so the e↵ect of as-
sertion is modeled as an operation that eliminates possibilities from the context
set. When one says ‘It’s raining’ and all goes well,4 possibilities in the context
set where it is not raining are eliminated. This reflects the fact that our shared
conversational information now ceases to be compatible with the possibility that
it isn’t raining.
The array of possible dynamic forces depends on the variety of interesting
dynamical changes that conversational states are capable of—a matter which of
course interacts with the question what kind of structure conversational states
are best modeled as having. Theorists working with a dynamic conception of
3While the present paper is greatly indebted to these works, the particular way of framing
the notion of dynamic force that will emerge here may not exactly align with any of them.
4By “All goes well” I mean that speaker was heard by the addressee, that both speak
English, that each takes herself to be in conversation with the other, etc.
Stalnaker glosses the dynamic update e↵ect of assertion as a “proposal” to change the
context set: my assertion of ‘It’s raining’ changes the context set in the way described only if
my interlocutor does not object. I think it is best to take the “proposal” talk metaphorically,
and not view assertion as literally explained as an illocutionary act of proposing. (That would
just pass the buck to the question what proposing is.) I myself would favor dropping the
“proposal” talk entirely, holding instead that assertions simply always change the state of the
conversation in their characteristic fashion. That is to say, the update does not “wait” for
the addressee’s permission, implicitly or explicitly. Rejections of assertions do not stop the
relevant changes to the conversational state from happening; rather, they undo a change that
has taken place.
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force often use richer objects than context sets in their models of conversational
states, recognizing additional structure as necessary to model whatever language
fragment is of target concern.
To give an illustration of this approach beyond ordinary assertion, consider
questions. Here it is obvious that without elaboration, the simple context set
picture is inadequate: a question like ‘Is it raining?’ does not characteristically
add information (eliminate possibilities) to the conversation; but neither does it
remove information (add possibilities). Abstractly, a question seems to “frame
an issue” in a way that serves to steer the discourse in a particular direction.
As Hamblin suggested in classic work, “Pragmatically speaking a question sets
up a choice situation between a set of propositions, namely those propositions
that count as answers to it” [Hamblin, 1973, 254]. Since the work of Hamblin
and Karttunen [1977], it has been usual to understand the semantic value of an
interrogative sentence as the kind of thing that determines a set of propositions,
the propositions that could serve to answer the question. Where the complete
possible answers to a question are mutually exclusive, we can think of a question
as determining a partition of logical space (Hamblin [1958], Belnap and Steel
[1976], Groenendijk and Stokhof [1984]). Now we can bring this idea into our
model of conversational states in various ways, in order to clarify and model
the dynamic force of questions of this kind. One simple possibility would be as
follows (cf. Roberts [1996, 2012], Hulstijn [1997], Yalcin [2011]5): we suppose
that a conversational state includes, in addition to a set of open possibilities (a
context set), a set of ways of partitioning logical space. We use the latter element
to model the question(s) that are in focus in the discourse. The characteristic
dynamic e↵ect of a question would be to eliminate partitions from this set.
Take for example the question ‘Is it raining?’ This will semantically determine
a simple bipartite partition of logical space into rain possibilities and no-rain
possibilities. The dynamic e↵ect of the question would be to remove from the
conversational state those partitions of logical space that fail to incorporate
at least this distinction. That is, it serves to rule out partitions that fail to
cut logical space in a manner that is sensitive to the question of rain.6 By
5It should be noted that the idea that the context set is interestingly partitioned in a
manner that is sensitive to the distinctions of interest to the interlocutors is an idea Stalnaker
has raised in various places; see, e.g., Stalnaker [1981, 1986, 2014].
6More exactly: say a partition of logical space (question) ⇧1 includes partition ⇧2 just
in case every element of ⇧2 is equal to the union of some set of elements of ⇧1. Then the
dynamic e↵ect of a question is to eliminate from the conversational state those partitions that
do not include the question. This is basically the notion of inclusion defined by Groenendijk
and Stokhof [1984] and by Lewis [1988a,b].
(I don’t mean to defend this particular theory of the dynamic force of questions here against
relevant competitors, the most obvious being perhaps Roberts [1996, 2012], who postulates
inter alia a component of the conversational state that tracks a sequence of questions ordered
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eliminating the partitions that fail to include question of rain, the question of
rain becomes, as it were, ‘visible’ or ‘in focus’ in the discourse.
Imperatives make for another illustration. Perhaps the best known recent
account in the dynamic force style is due to Portner [2004, 2007, 2017]. He
suggests that imperatives semantically express individual (address-relativized)
properties. He proposes (roughly) that a conversational state includes, for each
interlocutor, a “To-Do List” for that interlocutor—a sequence of properties that
the agent is mutually understood in the conversation to be under some kind of
requirement to realize. He then proposes that the dynamic force of an imperative
is to update the To-Do List of the addressee, adding the property expressed by
the imperative to the addressee’s To-Do List.
For at least a half-dozen more ways of enriching conversational states in order
to associate certain fragments of language with distinctive dynamic forces, see
Lewis [1979b]. He postulated a rich “conversational scoreboard” including a
number of dimensions beyond the context set, among them: (i) a ranking of
comparative salience of objects (for, e.g., tracking the way that the referent of a
definite description may be sensitive to the preceding discourse); (ii) a parameter
tracking the prevailing standards of precision (for modeling vagueness; see also
Lewis [1980], King [2003]); (iii) a component registering the admissible modal
accessibility relations (for modeling the dynamic e↵ect of unembedded modal
utterances); (iv) a parameter mapping names to their bearers (for modeling
the dynamic e↵ect of performative speech acts of dubbing); (vi) a component
representing the possible plans of the interlocutors (for modeling talk of what
to do).
I take it that dynamic force is basically the notion in play in what has
lately come to be called ‘dynamic pragmatics’ (see, e.g., Stalnaker [2017] [this
volume] and Portner [2017] [this volume]). But while typical proponents of
dynamic pragmatics frame that view as packaged with a rejection of dynamic
semantics, the notion of dynamic force operative here is meant to be neutral on
that issue. (The notion of dynamic force occurs at what Rothschild and Yalcin
[2015, 2016] call the ‘conversation systems’ level of description.) Whether or not
the compositional semantic value of a sentence is identical to its way of updating
the conversational state (its context change potential, or CCP), the dynamic
semanticist and the dynamic pragmaticist agree that (unembedded) sentences
have CCPs. Both can therefore ask, for various fragments of language, what
interesting distinctions there are to be made amongst the CCPs they recognize.
And as I am understanding it, that is just the question what the interesting
distinctions are between dynamic forces.
by priority. I just want a simple example of a dynamic force picture of (partition-like) questions
on the table.)
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3 That illocutionary force and dynamic force do not line up nicely
With illocutionary force and dynamic force distinguished, the next thing to em-
phasize is that they need not line up in any particularly neat way. The things
we are apt to call assertions in the illocutionary sense may be diverse in re-
spect of their dynamic forces; and in the other direction, it may be that a single
underlying dynamic force is what is in play across speech acts with diverse illo-
cutionary forces. I do not take this to be a new point. Stalnaker [1978] already
noted that his idea about dynamic force seemed appropriate to cases of what we
would naturally call, in the illocutionary sense, ‘assertion’ and also to what we
would naturally call in the illocutionary sense ‘supposition’, and that therefore
the account was not helpfully understood as an analysis of the traditional (illo-
cutionary) notion of assertion. Indeed, it is rather misleading to use the same
words—‘assertion’ and ‘force’—in both the illocutionary way and the dynamic
way. That can suggest competing analyses of the same phenomenon. But there
is no conflict here. These concepts apply at di↵erent levels of description.
It might be right to suppose that Stalnakerian assertoric dynamic force is
put to an especially common and important purpose in normal linguistic inter-
action, namely the purpose of transmitting belief or knowledge. That is why it
made some sense for Stalnaker to describe his dynamic model of conversational
update a model of what assertion typically does, taking ‘assertion’ in tradition
illocutionary sense. But this use to which the kind of dynamic force described
by Stalnaker can be put—the use of transmitting belief or knowledge—should
not be wrapped into its identity, or its conditions for individuation. To do that
would be to lose some of the power of this way of theorizing about conversation.
Stalnaker’s dynamic force account captures an abstract idea—basically, the
idea of adding some more information to a certain existing body of information
(viz., the conversational state). As I want to recommend we understand it,
the story prescinds from the question what exactly the conversational state is
taken by the interlocutors to be characterizing, and from the question what the
speaker might be aiming to do, extra-linguistically speaking, by adding certain
information to that state. In this way, it prescinds from exactly the kind of facts
that are thought to be essential for individuating speech acts on illocutionary
conceptions of force. This level of abstraction for theorizing about conversa-
tion is high—or if you prefer, narrow—but it is a fruitful one for modeling core
features of discourse and of our linguistic competence. It makes sense to distin-
guish the game of updating conversational states from the diverse uses to which
this game could be put—even when certain uses seem particularly canonical
or salient or important. In making a series of declarative statements, a person
may be recounting events that transpired yesterday, or they may be telling a
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story everyone mutually recognizes to be a fiction. In both cases, we should
like to say that they are exploiting the meaning of their sentences and certain
conventions about the dynamics of conversational update in their language to
add information to something like a store of information already mutually held
in common. In both cases we might naturally model the impact of these speech
acts on the conversational state in Stalnaker’s way, in terms of the elimination
of possibilities from a context set. The concept of dynamic force enables us to
capture key similarities about the dynamics of discourse across diverse uses of
language. Thus if we use ‘assertion’ in the dynamic force sense, we should not
be taken to be assuming anything very substantive about what the illocutionary
force of the speech act in question was.
There is a certain point that is apt to get lost in the preceding, so let me
pause to draw it out and emphasize it. One should not assume that the in-
formation captured by the conversational state, in the target technical sense
of ‘conversational state’, must reflect what is common belief among the inter-
locutors. The information incorporated into the conversational state needn’t
be common belief or common knowledge.7 Sometimes more is conversation-
ally common ground than what is common belief—as when we converse under
(explicit or tacit) hypothetical suppositions, or when we make polite conversa-
tion, allowing presuppositions into the conversation that we don’t plan to take
home. Other times, the state of the conversation does not include propositions
that are common belief, as when we reason under counterfactual suppositions,
or tell stories. Moreover, what exactly one comes away from a conversation
actually believing or knowing always depends on subtleties about trust and au-
thority (real and perceived). Such factors may, but needn’t, influence what one
lets into the conversational state. Whether they will or not in any given case
depends on the goals and interests of the interlocutors, and on the mutually
understood point of the conversation. A model of the abstract dynamics of
conversation, and of the general way in which the state of the conversation is
changed by speech acts, can to a great degree abstract from these factors.8 We
can postulate a basic mental state—call it presupposition, or the conversational
7In this paragraph I repeat some points made in Yalcin [2012a].
8Ko¨lbel [2011] puts the gist of it well:
...the exchange of information is only one among many ultimate purposes that
linguistic exchanges can have. When we converse in pursuit of the aim of in-
formation exchange, we do so by pursuing the language-internal objective of
changing the conversational score, an objective that can serve many other aims
too. We will gain a better understanding both of conversation and of information
exchange if we keep this in mind. (51)
The basic point carries over to dynamic forces which are not (or not merely) information-
adding moves.
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state—to play the desired role in theorizing about linguistic communication. It
is this state, in the first instance, that we are coordinating on in conversation.
(Thus we can say, for example, that   is common ground in a conversation just
in case it is common knowledge, or common belief, among the interlocutors that
  is being presupposed.) We need not show how to reduce this state of mind
to other, more familiar states in advance of theorizing. If it helps us to explain
things, it will earn its own keep.9
So again, there is no tension between the illocutionary and dynamic ap-
proaches to force. They are not competing analyses of the same phenomena,
but are rather concerned with di↵erent explananda. Readers who enjoy Aus-
tinian taxa should perhaps situate dynamic force as a feature of what he called
the “locutionary act”, inasmuch as fixing the dynamic force of a speech act still
generally leaves it substantially underdetermined what the speaker was up to,
or was trying to do, in performing a speech act with that dynamic force.
In separating illocutionary and dynamic notions of force, I am not trying to
attack those theorists who hope to theorize about illocutionary force by appeal
to a notion of dynamic force—who want to o↵er a theory of illocutionary forces
which appeals partly to an independently understood notion of dynamic force.
On the contrary, such theorists should welcome the distinction I press, since
in making this separation, I am drawing out a sense in which they can claim
to be explaining features of illocutionary acts using independently understood
materials.10
One kind of theorist in this vein holds that dynamic forces can be used to
9To be clear, I am not denying in advance of inquiry that the target notion of a conver-
sational state might somehow be reduced to other mental states. What I am rejecting is
the presupposition that some such reduction must be carried out in order for theorizing to
proceed. One needs to moor the technical notion in a su cient body of explanatory theory
before clear questions of reduction can be framed and profitably pursued.
10Am I one of these theorists? I see no problem with informal elucidations of familiar
sorts of illocutionary acts in part by appeal to their dynamic conversational e↵ects; on the
contrary, I employ such elucidations on occasion below, and have done so elsewhere (e.g.,
Yalcin [2007], Yalcin [2012a]). What is less clear to me is whether instructive, theoretically
fruitful general analyses of illocutionary acts/forces are possible. It does not appear that the
literature licenses great optimism about the prospects for a science of illocutionary acts, where
such a theory is understood as taking us beyond a relatively shallow botanization of human
speech behaviors, the later stated mostly in terms of common sense categories. Theories
in this vein seem at risk of devolving into conceptual analyses of common sense speech act
notions, with concomitant loss of grip on what was supposed to be getting explained. There is,
relatedly, a general worry, emphasized by Chomsky [2000], about the (un)fitness of ordinary
common sense notions for use in scientific inquiry (especially when what is to be explained
is human language and behavior). Common sense notions rarely perform well when pressed
into service as theoretical notions; they have their own lives. (I try to expand on this latter
worry in Yalcin [forthcoming].)
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group illocutionary forces. Stalnaker’s abstract treatment of the dynamic ef-
fect of assertion, for instance, might be argued to group together what ordinary
speakers call “assertion”, but also other speech acts like supposing or hypothe-
sizing. I myself am not especially interested in the prospects for constructing a
botany of illocutionary acts, so I leave it to others to show that such an approach
might yield some explanatory insight.11 In any case, whether such a theory can
be worked out is orthogonal to the point I’m making, which is just that there
is an interesting notion of dynamic force which does not reduce to, and is not a
species of, illocutionary force.
It could well be that the specific array of dynamic forces we in fact find in
natural language is explained, or partly explained, by the fact that we have an
interest in using such forces to perform various illocutionary acts. That idea is
entirely compatible with everything said so far.
On the view I favor, knowing the dynamic forces associated with the sen-
tences of a language is part of linguistic competence with the language. If we
think of language as complex tool that we do things with, I am situating dy-
namic force as a component of the tool, not as a component of actions of using
the tool. Once we start talking about actions of using the tool—once we are
talking about interlocutors qua rational agents, using language to achieve vari-
ous objectives, communicative and otherwise—we are at the speech act level of
description.
4 Normative language as distinctive in force
Having now separated two very di↵erent sorts of thing one could mean by ‘as-
sertion’, let us consider the idea that normative sentences are not assertion-
like. This is an idea that has permeated expressivist approaches to normative
discourse since those views began to take shape in the first half of the twenti-
eth century. Some representative early statements of this idea, beginning with
W.H.F. Barnes:
Value judgements in their origin are not strictly judgements at all.
They are exclamations expressive of approval. This is to be dis-
tinguished from the theory that the value judgement, “A is good,”
states that I approve A. The theory that I am now putting forward
11The question here is whether a speech act’s having an illocutionary force of a certain kind
implies it has a dynamic force of a certain kind. On the face of it, it seems not: it seems one
can know that, for instance, a speech act had the illocutionary force of a command without
knowing whether it had the dynamic force characteristic of an imperative, declarative, or
interrogative—plausibly one can issue commands in the illocutionary sense via various kinds
of context-change potential.
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maintains that “A is good,” is a form of words expressive of my
approval. To take an illustration :— When I say “I have a pain,”
that sentence states the occurrence of a certain feeling in me: when
I shout “Oh!” in a certain way that is expressive of the occurrence
in me of a certain feeling. We must seek then for the origin of
value judgements in the expressions of approval, delight, and a↵ec-
tion, which children utter when confronted with certain experiences.
[Barnes, 1934, 45]
Carnap:
The rule, “Do not kill,” has grammatically the imperative form and
will therefore not be regarded as an assertion. But the value state-
ment, “Killing is evil,” although, like the rule, it is merely an ex-
pression of a certain wish, has the grammatical form of assertive
proposition. Most philosophers have been deceived by this form into
thinking that a value statement is really an assertive proposition,
and must either be true or false. ... But actually a value statement
is nothing else than a command in a misleading grammatical form.
[Carnap, 1935, 24]
Russell:
If, now, a philosopher says “Beauty is good,” I may interpret him
as meaning either “Would that everybody loved the beautiful”... or
“I wish that everybody loved the beautiful”... The first of these
makes no assertion, but expresses a wish; since it a rms nothing, it
is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it,
or for it to possess either truth or falsehood. The second sentence,
instead of being merely optative, does make a statement, but it is one
about the philosopher’s state of mind, and it could only be refuted
by evidence that he does not have the wish that he says he has.
This second sentence does not belong to ethics, but to psychology or
biography. The first sentence, which does belong to ethics, expresses
a desire for something, but asserts nothing. [Russell, 1935, 236-7]
Ayer:
...in every case in which one would commonly be said to be mak-
ing an ethical judgment, the function of the ethical word is purely
“emotive”. It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but
not to make any assertion about them. [Ayer, 1936, 108]
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Stevenson [1937], building on Ogden and Richards [1923]:
Doubtless there is always some element of description in ethical judg-
ments, but this is by no means all. Their major use is not to indicate
facts, to create an influence. (18)
When you tell a man that he oughtn’t to steal, your object isn’t
merely to let him know that people disapprove of stealing. You
are attempting, rather to get him to disapprove of it. Your ethical
judgment has a quasi-imperative force... (19)
These views were set against what Austin [1962] and others later framed as the
descriptive fallacy :
It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business
of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of a↵airs, or to
‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely. (1)
It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embed-
ded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate
some specially odd additional feature in the reality reported, but to
indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the statement is
made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is
to be taken and the like. To overlook these possibilities in the way
once common is called the ‘descriptive’ fallacy... (3)
Considering now the thesis that normative sentences do not have the force
of assertions, two questions confront us:
(i) What sense of ‘assertoric force’ is at issue? Do we mean force in some
illocutionary sense? Some dynamic sense? Both?
(ii) What is the nature of the link between the meaning of normative vocab-
ulary and the putatively non-assertoric force of normative sentences?
Since as noted, the dynamic notion of force appeared on the scene only in the
seventies, early forays into the prospects for expressivist approaches to norma-
tive language worked with conceptions of force in the illocutionary vein. As
for the nature of the link between the meaning of normative vocabulary and
the putatively non-assertoric force of normative sentences, the details here were
often less than completely clear.12
12None of the above cited authors o↵ered anything like a detailed account, for instance.
Undoubtedly Hare [1952] was the most detailed midcentury attempt at working out the details.
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5 Frege-Geach
However, it was clear what the opponents of these approaches, notably Geach
[1965] and Searle [1969], took the view to be saying, or trying to say. They took
the idea to be that the connection between the meaning of normative vocabulary
and the putatively non-assertoric, non-descriptive force of normative sentences is
very tight. The meaning of normative vocabulary was to be explained by appeal
to the distinctive sorts of non-assertoric, non-descriptive illocutionary acts they
ostensibly participate in. The meaning of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, for instance, were to
be explicated by appeal to the observations that ‘good’ is used to perform the
speech act of commending, and the word ‘bad’ is used to perform the speech act
of condemning. The semantics of normative terms was somehow to be a matter
of associating them with the distinctive speech acts they enable. The usual
thought was that these distinctive speech acts corresponded to the expression
of distinctive non-doxastic (or not entirely doxastic) states of mind—perhaps
desire-like states of mind if Carnap and Russell were on the right track; perhaps
something more emotional in character, if Barnes and Ayer were on the right
track; perhaps some mix, if Stevenson was on the right track.
The fundamental di culty with this way of developing the idea, as Geach
[1965] and Searle [1969] famously stressed, is that meanings are compositional,
whereas illocutionary forces seem not to be. Here we can separate two related
points.
First and most obviously, the mere appearance of a particular word in a
construction cannot make it the case that a speech act of a particular illocu-
tionary type is being performed with that construction.13 There are ever so
many sentences in which ‘good’ (etc.) appears wherein there is no plausibility
that the corresponding speech act need be a commendation. On the contrary,
choose virtually any speech act force you please, and we will be able to produce
an example of an illocutionary act with that force which involves tokening a
sentence wherein ‘good’ (etc.) figures. This point is widely appreciated, so I’ll
skip examples.
The second point emphasizes the degree of disanalogy between meaning and
illocutionary force in respect of compositionality. Whatever the meaning of a
complex expression is, it had better be by and large fixed by the meanings
of its constituent parts plus the syntax of the expression. The assumption of
compositionality is part of what is required for natural language semantics to
play its part in explaining the productive character of language understanding
13There may be some limited exceptions. Perhaps one performs a speech act of derogation
in virtue of using a slur, no matter how deeply embedded it appears.
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and use.14 The illocutionary force associated with the utterance of a sentence, on
the other hand, is not helpfully understood as something somehow fixed by the
forces putatively associated with the individual primitive parts of the sentence
and their combination. Generally speaking, it rarely if ever even makes sense
to speak of the illocutionary force of subsentential constituents of a sentence
uttered. The locus of illocutionary force is the whole uttering-in-context qua
intentional act. What force an utterance has may certainly be constrained in
interesting ways by the meaning of the sentence uttered, but the illocutionary
force of a whole utterance is not somehow built up out of out the putative forces
of the sub-utterances of the constituent words.15
The classic Frege-Geach critique encourages a certain understanding of what
the expressivist thesis is, or was supposed to be. It suggests that expressivism is
a view that is supposed to take on the challenge of delivering a theory which de-
rives the forces of utterances compositionally—a theory which teaches how the
meaning of normative expressions can be given by explicating their connections
to distinctive illocutionary forces, in such a way as to respect the compositional-
ity of meaning. We could call this kind of approach to developing expressivism
compositional force expressivism.
Compositional force expressivism has a close cousin. According to it, ex-
pressivism is the view that is supposed to take on the challenge of delivering a
theory which associates, not forces, but attitudes—various mental state types—
with sentences compositionally. We could call this version compositional attitude
expressivism. The meaning of (e.g.) ‘good’ is not given by directly associating
it with speech acts of commendation; rather, it is associated with some kind of
‘pro-attitude’, or state of preference, or something along those lines. Calling x
good still amounts to performing a distinctive speech act of commendation; but
what makes the speech act a commendation is in part that the meaning of ‘good’
is somehow, as a matter of its meaning, tied to the attitude of favoring x. This
is roughly the sort of way that expressivism has been understood by many in
more recent times. Thus for example Rosen [1998], discussing Blackburn [1993]:
The centerpiece of any quasi-realist [expressivist] ‘account’ is what I
shall call a psychologistic semantics for the region: a mapping from
14I o↵er a more detailed discussion of this point in Yalcin [2014].
15Sometimes even anti-expressivist theorists, e.g. Geach [1965], slip into a way of talking
that suggests that subsentential clauses of sentences may have illocutionary forces. But theo-
rists who slip into this kind of talk rarely defend it or render it conceptually clear. Sometimes
what theorists have in mind by this kind of thing is clearly something more easily rendered via
the idea of dynamic force, about which more shortly. (Geach’s slips are mostly in connection
with facts that would be described from a modern perspective as facts about presupposition
projection—a famous impetus for the development of the notion of dynamic force.)
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statements in the area to the mental states they ‘express’ when ut-
tered sincerely. The procedure is broadly recursive. Begin with an
account of the basic states: the attitudes expressed by the simplest
statements involving the region’s characteristic vocabulary. Then
assign operations on attitudes to the various constructions for gen-
erating complex statements in such a way as to determine an ‘ex-
pressive role’ for each of the infinitely many statements in the area.
(387-8)
Similar characterizations of expressivism can be found in Blackburn [1998],
Wedgwood [2007], Schroeder [2008c], Charlow [2015].
On the face of it, the prospects for working out compositional attitude ex-
pressivism are as bleak as the prospects for working out compositional force
expressivism. From the point of view of the skeptic versed in modern natural
language semantics and pragmatics, they both seem based on the same category
mistake, namely the mistake of mislocating the locus of compositionality.
I leave it to others to sort out whether some version compositional force
expressivism or compositional attitude expressivism could be rendered viable.
It seems to me that there is a more promising path for developing the kind of
expressivist themes sounded by the authors cited above. It is basically the sort
of path I have explored elsewhere in connection, not with normative talk, but
with epistemically modal talk (Yalcin [2007, 2011, 2012a]). This path does not
involve any radical reconception of the notion of illocutionary force. Nor does
it involve any attempt at a compositional mapping from sentences to mental
states. Nor does it require a total rethinking of the foundations of semantics.
But to get to this kind of view, we need to say some things about how best
to conceive of the relations between compositional semantic value, content, and
dynamic force.16
6 The locus of compositionality
The locus of compositionality is not force, and neither is it attitude—so in a
nutshell goes the Frege-Geach critique of textbook expressivist views. But Frege
and Geach themselves could be critiqued for mislocating the locus of composi-
tionality. Specifically, they could be chided for failing to observe the distinction
between content and compositional semantic value, and for misconstruing the
relationship between content and the demands of compositionality.
16I regret I lack the space in this paper to chart the ways that my take on the Frege-Geach
problem di↵ers from others in the literature. The recent literature is especially influenced
by the framing of Unwin [2001]: see in particular Gibbard [2003], Dreier [2006], Schroeder
[2008a,b,c]. See also Charlow [2014], Ridge [2014], Woods [forthcoming].
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The semantic value-content distinction is stressed in various ways in Dum-
mett [1973, 1993], Lewis [1980], and Stanley [1997a,b], and more recently in Yal-
cin [2007, 2012a, 2014], Ninan [2010], Rabern [2012a,b, 2013], and Yli-Vakkuri
[2013].17 These works di↵er in where they place the stress, and in the termi-
nology used (in Dummett, the distinction appears as that between ‘ingredient
sense’ and ‘assertoric content’). My preferred take appears in Yalcin [2014] (it
owes significantly to Lewis [1980], Rabern [2012b], and to conversations with
Ninan). Without rehearsing the full story told there, the basic thought is that
the requirements on a notion of content suitable for modeling the mental states
we traditionally call ‘propositional attitudes’ are importantly di↵erent from the
demands appropriate to the notion of linguistic meaning (semantic value), and
in such a way that we shouldn’t expect the realizers of the content role to line
up in some particularly straightforward way with the realizers of the semantic
value role. In particular, there is little reason to theorize under the assumption
that the semantic values of sentences (in context) are identical with the objects
we find useful to call, in the theory of mental content, ‘contents’ (‘propositions’,
‘propositional content’, etc.).
This isn’t to say that we don’t or can’t assert propositions in something like
the traditional sense using ordinary declarative sentences. One can of course
still have that view compatible with respecting the distinction between semantic
value and content. It’s just that in such cases, it sows less confusion to see the
matter like this: the compositional semantic value of the sentence determines,
as a function of context, the item of content asserted (cf. Lewis [1980]). That
is all that is necessary to uphold the idea that we can assert propositions using
declarative sentences—viz., that there be some bridge principle, understood as
a feature of the pragmatics or ‘post-semantics’ of the language, connecting the
target class of sentences to propositional contents via the semantic values and
relevant features of context. Thus the suggestion isn’t that semantic value and
content are wholly disconnected. On the contrary, most will naturally want
to take the theory of mental content and the theory of linguistic meaning to
have deep and important interconnections. The point is merely that we should
distinguish these theoretical concepts and their associated explananda.
Semantic values are the locus of compositionality in natural language. It is
hardly a contestable thesis that they are compositional, since it is their job to
do their part in explaining the productive character of language understanding
and use, and this job appears undoable without compositionality. Content, on
17Burge [1979] argues that theorists have exaggerated the extent to which Frege pressed
senses into work as linguistic meanings. In a sense, Burge could be read as arguing that Frege
was alive to what I am here calling the semantic value-content distinction. This isn’t the place
to pursue the exegetical question, but I discuss the issue briefly in [Yalcin, 2015, 242].
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the other hand, may not be compositional in anything like that sense. The
assignment of contents to mental states may be a more global, holistic matter—
so in fact go the kind of pictures of mental content advanced by theorists like
Stalnaker [1984], Lewis [1994], and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson [2007], for
instance. (Indeed, even the theory of content implicit in Kaplan [1977/1989] is
(despite intentions) noncompositional, as Rabern [2013] shows.) What view one
prefers here depends on what one expects the notion of mental content to do—
what explanatory work it is supposed to perform—and it seems rarely the case
that theorists are working with just the same conception of that work. In any
case, the claim is not that it is necessary to sign up for one of these particular
views of content to proceed. It is enough to see that we can still intelligibly
debate the question whether content is compositional in some sense, even after
having agreed that linguistic meaning is compositional.
When we separate the notion of content and of semantic value, we clear
conceptual space for the possibility that:
The semantic values of declarative sentences are of a uniform type
in a manner conducive to compositionality, even though the commu-
nicative role of some declarative sentences is such as not to determine
truth-conditional propositional content of some traditional sort.
That is, we make room for the possibility that the role of some sentences—
stereotypically ‘descriptive’ sentences—in communication may be to express or-
dinary, world-characterizing truth-conditional propositional contents as a func-
tion of their semantic values, along traditional lines, whereas the communicative
role of other declarative sentences—normative sentences, perhaps—may not be.
And that idea in turn can be sharpened via the notion of dynamic force.
Even if the semantic values of declarative sentences take a uniform shape, there
may yet be semantically notable subtypes of declarative sentences, subtypes
that correspond to distinctive dynamic forces. A coherent possibility is that
sentences we intuitively describe as having normative import, while being of the
same semantic type as non-normative sentences, nevertheless form a semanti-
cally natural and distinctive class; and moreover that this class is associated
with a distinctive kind of conversational update in a way that vindicates the in-
tuitive thought that normative sentences are di↵erent in some communicatively
important way from straight factual assertion.
7 Static and dynamic expressivist paths
What does it mean to say that declarative sentences could be of a ‘uniform
semantic type’ despite also dividing into ‘semantically distinctive classes’ in such
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a way as to allow them to correspond to distinctive dynamic forces? This can
be—indeed, has been—made precise in a variety of ways. Let me mention two
possible paths, without presuming there aren’t others. My objective here is not
to lay out very detailed semantic-pragmatic proposals about specific expressions;
rather it is to clarify two shapes that detailed proposals could take.18
The first trail was in essence blazed by Gibbard [1986, 1990, 2003], though
notably he did not employ the notion of dynamic force I am recommending. Let
me describe a version of the idea. Assume a textbook intensional semantics of
the usual sort—say, in the style of the appendix of Kaplan [1977/1989]. But
in addition to parameters for context, possible world, and variable assignment,
take it that semantic values are relativized also to ‘systems of norms’ in the
style of Gibbard [1990]. (Or better, to ‘hyperplans’ in the style of Gibbard
[2003], and about which more below.) Thus formally speaking, all expressions
have as their semantic values functions from this kind of tuple of parameters
to extensions. The semantic values of declarative sentences in particular are
functions from such tuples to truth values. In this sense, declarative sentences
are of uniform semantic type.
Nevertheless, we can isolate the subclass of sentences whose truth-values are
sensitive to the value of the hyperplan parameter. The modeling idea is that
the normative sentences will correspond to this class. We can isolate this class
just as we can, e.g., semantically isolate the class of open sentences in first-order
logic. The situation is analogous. Semantically speaking, the open sentences are
(to an adequate first approximation) the ones whose truth values are sensitive
to the variable assignment; the closed sentences are the ones whose truth values
do not vary with the choice of variable assignment.19 The analogy here is worth
underlining. There is no Frege-Geach problem about open sentences—no prob-
lem about how it could be that the open and closed sentences of first-order logic,
despite their very real semantic di↵erences, can nevertheless intelligibly appear
in the same places in a compositional way. So it is, too, with norm-sensitive
sentences on Gibbard’s approach. The fact that these sentences are sensitive to
value of the norm parameter makes this class ‘semantically distinctive’ in the
relevant sense.
Once we acknowledge this semantically distinctive subclass of declarative
sentences, we are free to hypothesize that the sentences of this class may have
a distinctive dynamic role in conversation—that their dynamic force is not,
18The basic contours of the picture I present here appear in Yalcin [2007, 2011, 2012c]. I
discuss normative language in particular in Yalcin [2012a,b].
19‘First approximation’ because, of course, an open sentence like (Fx_¬Fx) may neverthe-
less be technically insensitive to the value of the assignment function. A more sophisticated
definition of ‘sensitive to (asignments, norms, etc.)’ could be given, but the exercise isn’t
necessary here.
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say, simply to add truth-conditional information to the conversational state
along textbook Stalnakerian lines. Their role may be to change a di↵erent
aspect of the conversational score, or anyway, to change more than just the
‘world-describing’ component of the conversational state. To use Gibbard’s
way of talking, normative sentences—or anyway, those of a paradigm sort—
would serve to update conversational states in respect, not (or not only) of
how things are, but also in respect of what is to be done. That is a way of
getting at the expressivist idea, voiced in the quotes above, that normative talk
is di↵erent from ordinary ‘descriptive’ assertion. To spell out this thought in
detail, we would want to postulate the relevant component of the conversational
state tracking “to be done-ness”—perhaps Portnerian To-Do Lists are what is
needed; perhaps the plans of Lewis [1979b]; perhaps the hyperplans of Gibbard
[2003] (explored in Yalcin [2012a]; see also Pe´rez-Carballo and Santorio [2016]);
perhaps all of the above; perhaps something else—and articulate how sentences
of the target class serve to change that feature of conversational states.
To an account like this we could add, further, that the relevant kind of con-
versational state change is often exploited to perform illocutionary acts we could
call something like “expressing norms”, acts that correspond to the expression
of states of mind that are not “prosaically factual”. (Just as we could say that
the sort of conversational state change Stalnaker described is often exploited
to perform illocutionary acts we could call “expressing beliefs” or “expressing
knowledge”.) Altogether, this path would seem to lead a coherent package of
views about normative discourse, a package that could reasonably be called
‘expressivist’.
This obviously is not yet to establish that this kind of path is the right one
to take for some particular subfragment of English; that is an empirical matter
that needs to be fought out in the usual way. It is just to clarify a coherent
possible form a semantics-pragmatics for some language could take, a form that
is recognizably expressivist in spirit.
Call this kind of expressivist plan ‘static’, as the details of implementation
involve the assumption of a static intensional semantics. A second, alternative
implementation would use the resources of dynamic semantics. The meaning
of a sentence on the dynamic semantic approach is given by the way it is apt
to change the state of the conversation. Formally, the compositional seman-
tic values of all sentences take the form of functions from conversational states
into conversational states—context change potentials. The semantic values of
declarative sentences on this approach would again be of uniform semantic type
in the sense relevant to compositionality. Still, we could isolate interestingly dif-
ferent subclasses of sentences, grouping sentences into characteristically similar
context change potentials. Again the basic thought would be that normative
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sentences invoke a characteristic sort of change to a component of the conversa-
tional state, one not merely adding more information to the state about what
the world is like. That they induce this kind of change would be something re-
flected, on the dynamic approach, directly in the semantic values of sentences.
And again, the thought would be that the relevant kind of conversational state
change is often exploited to perform illocutionary acts we could call something
like “expressing norms”.20
(The main di↵erence between the static and dynamic approach is that on
the static approach, we need some ‘bridge principle’ mapping the normative sen-
tences to their context change potentials, whereas no such principle is needed on
the dynamic approach (as it equips sentences with context change potentials di-
rectly in the compositional semantics). For example, if we accept Gibbard’s idea
that normative sentences are semantically the sort that determine a nontrivial
condition on (centered) world-hyperplan pairs, then we’d want a rule, akin to
Stalnaker’s assertion rule, telling us how this condition is supposed to serve to
change the state of the conversation—a rule that maps the output of the seman-
tics to a context change potential. The simplest version of such a rule would
perhaps postulate that the conversational state just is represented by a set of
(centered) world-hyperplan pairs, and that update is just intersection. On that
simple kind of picture, normative sentences will be conversationally distinctive,
because they will serve to eliminate (centered) world-hyperplan pairs in part as
a function of the hyperplan-component.)
Expressivism is often thought of as a special kind of semantic theory. The
version of expressivism I am now suggesting is not well-described that way.
I am suggesting that on the most plausible development, expressivism is not
a kind of semantic theory as model-theoretic truth-conditional semantics is a
kind of semantic theory, or as (say) Heim [1982]’s dynamic semantics is a kind
of semantic theory. Expressivism is not an alternative to these frameworks; on
the contrary, an expressivist view can be developed entirely within the context
of such frameworks. The misconception that expressivism must be seen as a
special kind of semantic theory stems in part from the tendency to conflate
semantic value with content, together with the idea that items of content each
determine a ‘factualist’ truth-condition, understood as fixing a ‘way the world
might be’. Expressivism will seem radical if one thinks orthodoxy in semantics
requires making these assumptions. But to think that is to misunderstand
truth-conditional semantics in the familiar model-theoretic style.
20See Charlow [2015], Starr [2016], Willer [2016, forthcoming] for developments of expres-
sivist ideas about normative language using tools from dynamic semantics. Veltman’s work
on the dynamic evolution of expectation patterns in discourse, in connection with words like
‘normally’, is one important relevant precedent (Veltman [1996]).
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Since the basic expressivist idea can be realized in the context of quite di↵er-
ent compositional semantic theories, it is not itself well-characterized as a thesis
about the shape of a compositional semantic theory. In general, one cannot nec-
essarily read an expressivist view directly o↵ of a compositional semantic theory.
Better to think of expressivism as a view in pragmatics, or at the semantics-
pragmatic interface. It is a kind of view that may be seen as imposing some
high-level constraints on semantics. Expressivism about a fragment of language
comes in (or doesn’t) when we take a certain stand on the relation between the
compositional semantic values of the fragment and their dynamic force, and in
the relation between dynamic force and the sorts of states of mind they are apt
to express in various contexts.
8 Normative states of mind in an expressivist setting
To make some of the preceding slightly more concrete, let me walk through one
conception of the underlying normative states of mind that normative language
is, according to the expressivist, in the business of expressing. The story is
substantially inspired by Gibbard [2003], though certain aspects will be depart
from Gibbard’s preferred development.
The story begins with a model of normative states of mind. Formally speak-
ing, Gibbard’s way of modeling attitudes begins with the abstract, idealized
model of attitudes given by Lewis [1979], in which a state of belief is repre-
sented as a set of centered worlds, intuitively the centered worlds compatible
with the way the agent takes herself to be situated in the world. Gibbard adopts
this much structure to model what it is to have a factual view, a view about how
the world is (and about where one is within it). He then adds further structure
to model what it is to have normative view, which he takes fundamentally to
be a view concerning what to do. To have a view about what to do is to have
a plan. To model normative, plan-like states of mind, Gibbard introduces a
technical notion, the hyperplan. As a single centered world might be used to
characterize a state of mind completely opinionated concerning every matter
of fact, so a hyperplan can be used to characterize a state of mind completely
opinionated about what is okay to do in any situation. Thus a hyperplan is a
maximal contingency plan: it
... covers any occasion for choice one might conceivably be in, and
for each alternative open on such an occasion, to adopt the plan
involves either rejecting the alternative or rejecting rejecting it. In
other worlds, the plan either forbids an alternative or permits it.
(56)
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A hyperplan can thus be construed as a mapping from a set of available op-
tions to some subset of those options—the options deemed by the hyperplan as
permissible.21
Equipped with this notion of a hyperplan, Gibbard modifies Lewis’s model
of belief states. Instead of modeling them as sets of centered worlds, he proposes
we model them as sets of centered world-hyperplan pairs. We can say these are
models of plan-laden states of belief, states of mind that intertwine a view about
how things are with a view about what is to be done. One’s view about purely
descriptive, worldly matters of fact is settled by the centered worlds that one’s
plan-laden belief state leaves open. But one’s normative views—for instance,
one’s views about what ought to be the case—depend at least in part on the
hyperplans that one’s plan-laden belief state leaves open. Just as what one
believes in the prosaically factual sense is reflected in what is true at every
centered world compatible with what one believes, so what one believes about
what to do is reflected in what is common to every hyperplan left open by one’s
state of belief. If I plan to pack, for instance, then every hyperplan left open
by my state of belief calls for packing relative to the options I take myself to
have.22
To believe I ought to pack more or less just is, for Gibbard, to plan to pack.
The story is aimed inter alia at clarifying the tie between normative thought
and motivation, at removing the mystery of why the belief that I ought to pack
motivates packing.
Planning states are understood broadly: one can have plans, both about
what one is to do in the situation one takes oneself to be in, and also plans
about what to do in situations that one does not take oneself to be in. Even if
one recognizes that one is not Obama, one can have a view about what to do
if faced with Obama’s options. This view is a planning attitude in the relevant
sense.
We could describe Gibbard as o↵ering a model of the contents of belief states,
a model aimed at capturing what is distinctive about normative thought. As we
have stressed in earlier pages, a model of content still leaves much open from the
point of view of compositional semantics. There are many ways one might try to
bring these abstract ideas to bear on the semantics and pragmatics of normative
language. But I first want to consider some questions about Gibbard’s model
of content of a more foundational nature.
21Schroeder [2008a] writes that Gibbard “assumes that hyperplanners are always decided
either to do A or to not do A, for any action A” (53). Not so: a hyperplan (and thus any
hyperplanner whose state is modeled by the hyperplan) may deem both A and ¬A permissible.
22Note that the options one takes oneself to have are fixed by what one believes in the
prosaically factual sense. In this way, one’s view about what ought to be the case is sensitive
to what one takes the facts to be.
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Some theorists may have the feeling that the appeal to hyperplans in mod-
eling normative states of mind engenders only an illusion of explanation or
understanding. ‘Hyperplan’ may seem to be a name for a mystery, or a merely
formal widget that distracts from the real philosophy. One aspect of the concern
may trace to the postulation of a new primitive element. Most theorists who
use (centered) possible worlds to model belief content would have them in their
ontology anyway—the concept of a possible world is very plausibly intelligible
independently from their particular use in modeling content. (Indeed, many
theorists, notably Stalnaker [1984] and Lewis [1986, 1994], hope to explain the
intentionality of the mental in part by relying on a non-intentional conception of
modality.) Hyperplans, on the other hand, seem to arrive on the scene as a new
primitive without independent motivation; and it can seem we have no indepen-
dent grip on what they are that is analogous to the independent grip we have
on the notion of a possible world. Gibbard eases us into the notion by appeal to
the idea of a completely decided agent—a hyperplanner. But if hyperplans are
explained entirely in term of normative states of mind—if all that can be said
by way of clarifying the notion of a hyperplan is that it approximates the state
of mind of a completely decided agent—then we seem to be modeling normative
states of mind and their interrelations with the help of... a primitive notion of
normative states of mind. This circle is rather tight. It can be hard to see any
path here for understanding normative states of mind and their properties as
explicable in other terms, as grounded in more basic facts.
Confronted with this kind of request to say more about the idea of plan-
laden belief, I am inclined to favor a reaction that seems to depart from the
reaction favored by Gibbard [2012]. There are two parts to the response.
The first part of the response is to observe that we needn’t take hyperplans
as primitive elements of the model. These objects can be constructed from
antecedently available ontological resources: sets and possibilia. We said that a
hyperplan is basically a mapping from options to a subset of those options. Let’s
now take this now literally: hyperplans are functions on sets of options. The
question then arises what options are. We can model an option as a centered
worlds proposition (a set of centered worlds)—the conditions under which the
option can be said to be realized. Thus a hyperplan is a function from a set
of centered worlds propositions (understood as a set of available options for
some possible agent) to some subset thereof. So we can construct hyperplans
from independent resources, resources we have a grip on independently of their
application in modeling normative states of mind.23 This does something to
23Even simpler, we could take a hyperplan to be a function from the union of the set of
options to a union of some subset of those options. (So I suggested in Yalcin [2012a].) But
this leaner description may be inadequate for cases where a plan-laden state seems somehow
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demystify hyperplans.24
The second part of the response begins by framing the question:
In virtue of what is an agent’s state of belief well-modeled by a given
set of centered world-hyperplan pairs?
This we could call the foundational question about plan-laden content. Any
formal model of attitude states faces a foundational question of this sort. It
asks what it is about a situated agent that makes it the case that their state of
mind is representable by some formal object in the model rather than some other
formal object. It may be that some of the concern about the extent to which
Gibbard’s approach to normative states of mind is adequately explanatory stems
from unclarity about what the shape of the answer to this question is supposed
to be. If one has no grip at all on what it could be about an agent that makes
it the case that their state of mind has one body of plan-laden content rather
than another, the account is apt to seem mysterious.
Theorists who agree about the shape of a formal model of the attitudes
may nevertheless disagree about the answer to the corresponding foundational
sensitive to the way the options are partitioned.
24Let me add another point of clarification. I am taking it (following Gibbard) that the
plans that one’s state leaves open will generally interact with/be sensitive to what worlds one’s
belief state leaves open (alternatively, sensitive to how one apportions credence across logical
space), and suggesting that it is easier to understand the way they interact if hyperplans are
not taken as primitive but built out of (formalized with) possibilia. But I am thinking of the
plan structure of an agent’s state as additional structure—structure that we can, as theorists,
usefully separate out from the set of worlds (or probability space) that corresponds to the
agent’s doxastic state. So from the point of view of the modeling theory, we are separating
the planning structure from the doxastic structure—much as, e.g., the decision theorist wants
to separate out a state corresponding to belief and another state corresponding to preference.
Now this might seem confusing when it comes to approaching the semantics of natural
language, because I want to allow that certain belief ascriptions (e.g., ‘John thinks he ought
to pay his taxes’) might sometimes place conditions on the plans the subject’s state leaves
open (in addition to the worlds their doxastic state leaves open). So there is not a straight
line from what the theorist calls a “doxastic state”, which is to do only with modeling what
the world is like according to the agent, and object-language belief ascription, which can mix
ascription of factual and plan-like content. But there is no problem here. You might compare
this to the semantics of ‘wants’. As theorists, we find it fruitful to model preference as some
sort of ordering over possible states of the world. But when it comes to the semantics of
‘wants’, it may turn out that ‘wants’-ascriptions also place conditions on the subject’s state
of belief (as e.g. Heim [1992] suggests, drawing inter alia on Stalnaker [1984]). So ordinary
talk of what an agent wants admixes features of what they prefer and what they believe. Still,
again as theorists, there’s a sense in which the agent’s preference ordering alone gets at a
natural psychological joint, and models the agents desires in a pure but abstract sense.
As for whether to call the additional planning structure ‘cognitive’, the answer is ‘no’ if by
‘cognitive’ we just mean doxastic. But if ‘cognitive’ means something like intentional mental
state, then certainly planning states are cognitive (as are states of preference). (Thanks to
Mahrad Almotahari for discussion.)
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question. So we can expect there to be various responses that expressivists
in the Gibbardian vein might have. But to sketch one direction in order to
give a sense of things, it is natural to consider the corresponding foundational
question as it arises for Lewis [1979c], since as noted, Gibbard’s formal model
is an extension of Lewis’s.
Again, Lewis [1979c] models a state of belief as a set of centered worlds. We
intuitively describe this as the set of centered worlds compatible with where, for
all the agent believes, she is. Lewis also puts it like this: to believe that P is to
self-ascribe the property corresponding to the set of worlds P . But of course,
these intuitive descriptions are not meant to supply deep explanations: they
just show how the formal talk is meant to connect with informal belief talk. If,
given an agent A in w modeled with centered worlds belief content p, we ask:
What is it about A in w that makes it the case that p is the content
of A’s belief state in w?
Lewis has an answer. The basic contours of his answer are given in Lewis [1984,
1986, 1994]. Not really needing a full review (and lacking space for it anyway),
I stick to a crude highlight reel. Like many theorists, Lewis takes it that the
contents of mental states are supposed to be (at least) causal-explanatory prop-
erties of them vis-a-vis action. Particular hypotheses about the belief and desire
contents of an agent generate ceteris paribus predictions about how the agent
will be disposed to act in various circumstances. Belief and desire states are,
Lewis thinks, constitutively rational. These states are the occupants of certain
functional roles, and it is just part of the functional roles associated with be-
lief and desire that beliefs and desires tend to cause behavior that serves the
subject’s desires according to her beliefs. Roughly, belief, desire, and action are
constitutively related at least as follows:
If agent A is in a belief state with the centered content B and in a
desire state with centered content D, then A is disposed to act in
ways that would tend to bring it about that he is located within D,
were it the case that he occupied a centered world within B.
Belief and desire are causally e cacious inner states whose content is consti-
tutively rational in (at least) this way. Roughly, the full belief-desire state of
an agent is the one most apt to produce agent’s dispositions to act compatible
with the above, and which otherwise maximizes the extent to which the agent’s
belief content is eligible—that is, sensitive to reality’s objective structure.25
25The appeal to eligibility is motivated by the fact that without it, many intuitively incorrect
assignments of belief-desire content would nevertheless preserve constitutive rationality and
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That is Lewis’s approach to grounding facts about contentful states of mind.
This story is responsive to the foundational question raised by the centered
worlds modeling framework. It does much to clarify the subject matter of that
model—the phenomena being modeled by it. In a certain sense, it o↵ers a way
of interpreting the model.
I don’t have the aim of arguing that Lewis’s particular foundational picture
is correct. Rather, what I want to suggest is that the sort of expressivism I have
described can approach the foundational question framed above in the same
basic way. If we can see this expressivist and the Lewisian as basically on par—
as facing similar foundational questions, and as having similar sorts of answers
at their disposal—that will suggest that no qualitatively di↵erent foundational
or ‘metasemantic’ challenges are faced by the expressivist per se; and it will
help to further demystify the role of hyperplans in the expressivist’s model.
So how can the expressivist who models with Gibbard’s tools approach the
foundational question framed above in the same basic way as the Lewisian? She
can do this by articulating the constitutive functional interconnections between
belief (or credence), desire (or preference), and her postulated planning states.
Moving beyond the familiar belief-desire framework assumed by Lewis, she can
suppose that rational action centrally involves also states of planning. We can
expect the detailed functional interconnections between these three states to be
elaborate, but it seems safe to hypothesize that the functional interconnections
will include at least something like the following. Agents are disposed to act
in ways which would conform with their plans, in centered worlds with respect
to which their (purely factual) belief content is true. Where such plans leave
several options open, agents tend to elect those options which would serve best
to satisfy their preferences. And where agents find themselves in unplanned-
for situations, we appeal only to belief and desire. That is, we say that such
agents will be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy their desires,
in centered worlds where their beliefs are true—leaving intention out of it.
Of course, that’s brief—we should try to say more. But then, so should the
Lewisian. The point is that Gibbard’s kind of model of content should not be
regarded as more mysterious than the sort of (unmysterious) accounts favored by
theorists in the possible worlds tradition upon which he is building, such as those
of Lewis [1994] or Stalnaker [1984]. Moreover, as I read it, it seems to me much
of Gibbard [2003] (not to mention important earlier work by Bratman [1987]) is
anyway concerned to draw out and explore the rich functional interconnections
between belief, desire, and planning—so that this is hardly work left entirely
make the correct predictions about action. The basic contours of that worry go back to
Putnam [1980]. See Stalnaker [1984] for a di↵erent approach. See also Stalnaker [2004] for a
critique of Lewis’s particular way of appealing to eligibility.
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undone.
Gibbard [2012] writes:
Expressivists need to explain the inconsistency of states of mind, or
help themselves to the notion unexplained. They need to do this in
a way that doesn’t rest on a prior understanding of consistency in
thoughts, propositions, or other items of mental content—or their
analysis isn’t truly expressivistic. (277)
Here it seems my expressivist tale parts ways with Gibbard’s. I suggest we can
model states of belief as having plan-laden content. Items of plan-laden content
stand in various familiar logical relations. Inconsistency between states of mind
traces to their inconsistent content. States have content in virtue of their func-
tional interconnections to each other and in virtue of subsidiary requirements
on prosaically factual belief (such as that its content be suitably eligible along
the lines of Lewis, as sketched above; or that it be a state that normally carries
information, as suggested by, e.g., Dretske [1981], Stalnaker [1984]; or perhaps
some two-dimensional admixture of these; or perhaps something else—debates
continue).
Thus the expressivism I have sketched is conceived of as one that conserva-
tively extends an already familiar functionalist and ‘representationalist’ concep-
tion of attitude states. But Gibbard appears to have it that his expressivism call
for a quite di↵erent foundational picture. Further, he seems to suggest that an
account proceeding along the lines I have described is not truly expressivistic.
Why take it be expressivistic? So far, the story is expressivist in that nor-
mative thought is not fully factual in character. To believe that one ought to
pack is not to be belief-related to some possible worlds truth-condition, to a
way things might have been. It isn’t merely to represent the world, or one’s
position in the world, as being a certain way rather than other. It is to have
a view about what to do, in the sense formalized and functionally explicated
above. What still remains is to connect this model of normative states of mind
to language—to matters of meaning and communication. But on natural ways
of forging those connections, it is not hard to see how to end up with a view vin-
dicating the traditional expressivist thought that normative talk is not purely
factual in character.
9 Normative language in an expressivist setting
In a big picture way, we have already said how that story can go. Let me restate.
To have a model of the state of the conversation that can comport nicely with the
plan-laden conception of belief, we can make conversational states themselves
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plan-laden. We can, for example, model conversational states as sets of centered
world-hyperplan pairs.26 We then hold that normative talk is in the business
of eliminating such pairs—or more broadly, of changing the state—in ways that
are sensitive to the plan component. This characteristic di↵erence in the way
that normative sentences would be apt to change the state of the conversation
is a di↵erence in dynamic force.
Where does talk of “expressing a normative state of mind” come in? Here
again it pays to be mindful of the distinction between illocutionary and dynamic
force. In changing the conversational state in respect of the plans it leaves
open, one is often expressing one’s normative beliefs—the latter understood
expressivistically as above. When we change the conversational state in this
kind of way, is it always to express the normative view one in fact endorses?
No—no more than ordinary factual conversational update is always a matter of
expressing one’s true state of belief. We stressed earlier that the dynamic notion
of force prescinds largely from one’s distal objectives in communication. Often
we do change the state of the conversation in something like the way Stalnaker
taught, and often (not always) we do that with the mutually understood aim
of transferring belief, knowledge, a view about how the world really is, and
the like. When those subsidiary elements are in place—aspects that come into
focus when we approach the performance as an illocutionary act, locating it
in a particular kind of space of human interests and objectives—we might then
sensibly identify the speech act move made as an “expression of belief”. We need
the same kind of subtlety when it comes to talk of “expressing one’s normative
view” on an expressivist approach.
It could be right to say that “expressing one’s normative view” is what is
happening in most ordinary cases we’ll want to model dynamically in terms of
elimination of hyperplans. When it is one’s normative state that is prompting
one’s utterance, when the condition on hyperplans determined by the speech
act accords with the speaker’s actual normative state, and when it is mutually
recognized that the speaker is attempting to engender coordination in respect
of normative states, then it will be seem natural to call what is happening
“expressing one’s normative view”. When all these background factors (and
perhaps more) are in place, the expressivist might want to further claim that
normative sentences so deployed characteristically involve a distinctive illocu-
tionary force—“norm expression”, say. I myself am not sure what value it would
add to make this kind of declaration, since I am not sure there is much of an
26Compare Yalcin [2012a]. Some orthogonal subtleties arise here in connection with using
centered worlds in a model of the conversational state; see, e.g., Egan [2007], Stalnaker [2008].
It may be preferable to generalize, using multi-centered worlds in place of centered worlds.
For further discussion of that approach, see Stalnaker [2008, 2014], Ninan [2012].
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interesting general theory of illocutionary force to be given;27 but we needn’t get
into that. The point is to separate the vaguely illocutionary idea of “norm ex-
pression” from the idea that some fragments of language interact especially with
the planning aspect of the conversational state. These will often go together,
according to the sort of expressivist described, but they are not the same thing.
We should, in particular, be alive to other ways we might find ourselves
messing with plan-laden conversational states. For example, just as the worlds
compatible with a context set might be taken, in context, to be characterizing
a fictional universe rather than the actual world, so the plans a conversational
state leaves open might, in context, be mutually recognized as characterizing
what is so according to some particular plan that no party to the discourse in fact
endorses (cf. Lewis [1979b]). That is logically possible, anyway. If there are such
cases, we would want to describe the states of mind expressed as descriptive or
factual in character, despite their similarity in dynamic respects to cases which
clearly do involve the expression of normative states. There is no problem here
for the expressivist—just distinctions to avoid tripping upon in imposing the
vague word “express” upon an otherwise clear theory.
It should be acknowledged that the point we have reached is far in important
respects from some of the early expressivists cited above. Normative talk is
not much like exclamation (pace Barnes [1934]); nor does it serve to express
preference (pace Carnap [1935] and Russell [1935]) or feeling (pace Ayer [1936]).
But in accord with these authors, and with the spirit of the quote from Austin
above, the view is that normative talk serves express states of mind that are
not straightforwardly factual in character.
10 Empirical plausibility
If the preceding seems to leave the impression that expressivism about normative
discourse faces only smooth sailing, it is time to bring the bad news. Metaethical
expressivism is, inter alia, supposed to be a thesis about the meaning of some
fragment of natural language. About this sort of thesis we can separate two
issues:
(i) logical possibility. Is the thesis even in principle compatible with a
compositional semantics for some elementary possible language? Can we
even make sense of a communication system that works along expressivist
lines?
27There is the worry that such a theory verges on a “theory of everything” of the sort
derided by Chomsky [2000].
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(ii) empirical plausibility. Can the thesis be well-motivated for a fragment
of some actual natural language?
I have largely been concerned with describing a rmative answers to the log-
ical possibility questions, seeing these questions as prior. I have not said
anything very substantive about empirical plausibility. But of course, our
expressivist means to say that a fragment of natural language actually works
in the way described—it interacts with the plan structure of the conversational
state, and is apt for giving voice to plan-laden states of mind. This places
some abstract constraints on the semantics of natural language—in particular,
normative expressions need to be given semantic values which interact with hy-
perplans in the right ways, generating sentences whose context change potentials
are adequate for the expression and transmission of plan-laden states of mind.
(Normative predicates would seem to need plan-sensitive extensions; deontic
modal operators would seem to need to involve quantification over hyperplans,
etc.) It is perfectly possible for there to be such semantic values. But is there
empirical motivation for the thesis that sentences of natural language have such
semantic values?
It is interesting that Gibbard [2003] never attempts to put hyperplans to
nontrivial compositional semantic work—for instance, by articulating the com-
positional semantics of deontic modals, or the attitude verbs ‘decides’ or ‘be-
lieves’, etc., by appeal to hyperplans in the semantic metalanguage. This is
the sort of thing that would be required to motivate the added structure from
semantics-internal considerations.28 A natural place to start might be with
sentences like these:
(1) John thinks that he ought to pack.
It is natural to start here because our expressivist o↵ers special truth-conditions
for this sentence: on her theory, its truth turns on the hyperplans that John’s
state rules in and out. But to give truth-conditions is not yet to give a com-
positional semantics. The task for the expressivist is to show how to determine
these truth-conditions via the compositional semantics of the sentence using the
advertised hyperplans, and in a way that meshes with what is already known
about the semantics of the constituent expressions of the sentence. (See Yalcin
[2012a] for one start at this task.) A similar task awaits the expressivist for
normative predicates in general. Much work remains to be done here. The
expressivist approach needs prove itself in the details in natural language se-
mantics and pragmatics. But recent work developing expressivist ideas using
28This perhaps only highlights how di↵erent the present conception of expressivism is from
Gibbard’s.
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tools from formal pragmatics suggests some cause for optimism—or anyway, an
open mind.29
Further, theorizing in semantics and pragmatics with plans may teach us
more about what plans must be like, what constraints they are subject to.
Assigning plans semantic and pragmatic work to do is a way of constraining a
theory of them. Seeking reflective equilibrium between a theory of normative
language and a theory of normative thinking, we can progress on both.
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